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leader's obvious attraction to a soldier that the platoon leader has a 
"crush" on? 
One solution might be to keep women out of those military 
jobs that place heavy reliance upon day-and-night personal bonds 
created by discipline and leadership, and instead to put women only 
in jobs that are more like civilian positions. Perhaps the current 
restrictions on women in combat serve as a rough substitute for this 
purpose. If so, then combat restrictions may survive "intermediate" 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Instead, Stiehm repeatedly suggests a different solution: segre-
gation by gender (pp. 204, 208), even to the point of reserving the 
Air Force for women (pp. 6, 237).11 Most readers will find this too 
radical. It gives the lie to a rationale based on equal opportunity for 
individuals. Stiehm reasons that if some specialties are reserved in 
effect for men because of physical strength requirements, then fair-
ness requires that some jobs not requiring such strength be effec-
tively reserved for women (p. 204). Overqualification would thus 
become disqualification as a matter of policy. 
On the other hand, if separate-but-equal is not an acceptable 
solution, then much of Stiehm's analysis implicitly supports limiting 
the female role in the military. One might have expected Mitchell's 
furious contentions to have been dissolved in the rational light of 
Stiehm's careful study. Instead, this reader is left with the uneasy 
feeling that there is a serious problem here: "fairness" in the con-
text of women's opportunities in the military may be more inconsis-
tent with efficiency than we have ever found it in other contexts. 
THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE 
MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE. By Thomas L. 
Pangle.1 Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press. 1988. Pp. 344. $24.95 cloth; $14.95 paper. 
Robert Fau/kner2 
This book will be unusually illuminating for thoughtful stu-
dents of American constitutional arrangements. I say this confi-
dently, although Professor Thomas Pangle's work says little about 
11. Curiously, she finds the need to reintegrate basic training "almost self-evident" (p. 
237). 
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto. 
2. Professor of Political Science, Boston College. 
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constitutionalism and will be occasionally dismissed, in the feuds of 
academe, as sectarian. Professor Pangle addresses not the country's 
laws but its aims, especially the justice of its aims. He weighs the 
"moral vision" of various framers and, at greater length, of the 
Lockean philosophy that broadly guided them. This may sound 
moralistic or antiquarian. It is neither. Pangle is weighing, notre-
counting, and he interrogates first-rate statesmen and thinkers of 
comprehensive views; his book investigates family, economy, divin-
ity, and governing, as well as the rights and goods of persons. Actu-
ally, this work is an instructive advance on the abstract and 
moralistic analysis that often passes these days for moral philoso-
phy. The title is telling: "The spirit of modem republicanism." 
We all know Tocqueville's remark that in the United States 
every political question eventually becomes a legal question. The 
reverse has become truer: with the modem emphasis on the mallea-
bility of the Constitution, and the overriding importance of social 
justice, every legal question becomes a political-philosophic ques-
tion, especially among constitutional scholars. But which philoso-
phy and which politics? And what distinguishes philosophy from a 
gaggle of contradictory ideological projects? 
These are the questions that Pangle addresses. His intent is not 
simply or perhaps chiefly political. He means to show what philo-
sophic thoughtfulness promises and demands, precisely in the con-
fused state of mind in which Americans, especially thoughtful 
Americans, now find themselves. He would show them how "to 
liberate the mind from the spirit of the age" by engaging in dialogue 
with the "small minority" of truly thoughtful politicians and think-
ers. He would show how thoughtfulness-philosophy in the old 
sense-is provoked precisely by the singularly theoretical basis of 
the American order. Pangle thus adds a voice unsurpassed in learn-
ing and reasoning power to the contemporary disputes over modem 
liberalism; the book manifests an unobtrusive but unusual moral se-
riousness as well as an obtrusive but elevated humanity. These vir-
tues are inseparable from intellectual seriousness. Dialogue proves 
to require more than the sensitive openness to others' concerns 
which the term often connotes today. Pangle would advance So-
cratic or philosophic dialogue: a solicitude for penetrating opin-
ions, combined with a sympathetic but direct cross-examination as 
to their justice and truth. Pangle's dialogue bestows real dignity, 
where it is due, while discouraging the obsequiousness and the tacit 
pretension that accompany "openness." 
The first and shortest of the book's three parts examines sev-
eral contemporary portrayals of the American order. E.S. Corwin's 
462 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:460 
old orthodoxy had supposed an historically developing constitution-
alism; it missed the fundamental novelty of the framers' republican-
ism. Marxist commentators appreciate the novelty, but in a twisted 
way. While the best Marxists such as C.P. McPherson depart from 
the strict determinism of Marx, they remain enmeshed in a woollier 
but still incoherent reduction of even the best founders and thinkers 
to an economic and social context. Weberians, on the other hand, 
cannot sustain their reduction of modern profit-seeking capitalism 
to self-denying Calvinism or of even the congenial Franklin's work 
ethic to an austere Kantianism. Louis Hartz, at least, followed Toc-
queville and stressed the influence of Locke and the liberal tradi-
tion; he was, however, loose and impressionistic as to Tocqueville, 
Locke, and liberalism. 
Pangle's most useful service to contemporary scholarship is an 
evisceration of the so-called classical republican school, led by 
J.G.A. Pocock and Gordon Wood. This school, strangely influen-
tial in the academy, traces the country's founding to a civic republi-
canism separable from Lockean individualism and derived from the 
English country Whigs (and ultimately from a long tradition going 
back through Machiavelli to the Roman republic and Aristotle). 
According to Pangle, the eighteenth century books and pamphlets 
that have been designated classically republican are themselves suf-
fused with liberal doctrines of natural rights, the state of nature, 
and representative government. What the classical republican 
school means by that term is not really ancient republicanism; mod-
ern scholars see the classical version through the more democratic, 
institutional, and cynical lenses provided by Machiavelli and his fol-
lowers. Pangle finds the root of these academic distortions in 
Hannah Arendt's rather Heideggerian longing for an anti-theoreti-
cal and activist politics. 
In the second part of the book Pangle moves beyond contem-
porary rereadings to characterize the self-understanding of the 
founders. While theirs might seem the classical republicanism of 
Rome or of The Federalist's "Publius," the American founders 
thought themselves innovators; thought that the true foundations of 
republicanism had been laid only lately; criticized the small repub-
lics of old as petty, repressive, faction-ridden and fierce; gave prior-
ity to security and rights; and supposed that good government was 
in tension with republican government. 
What then distinguishes the founders' republicanism? Pangle 
chides scholars for muddying the relevant alternatives. While Ar-
endt, for example, stirred a Pocock or a John Diggins to revive a 
classical alternative, her rejection of universal standards of right is 
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remote from all previous understandings of republicanism, and her 
praise of love of glory and recognition is Machiavellian and not 
classical. After making these points, Pangle offers a series of bril-
liant little comparisons of classical republicanism with variations on 
the modern alternative that guided the American founders. 
Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon praise the friendship of citi-
zens, not merely an equilibrium of interests and factions. Pluralism 
is not enough. Yet they also deprecate civic virtue as merely citizen 
virtue; it is not the full virtue of the fine man. Despite a cool aware-
ness of the compromises and resignation that practicality may dic-
tate, they thought republicans should esteem admirable thought 
and conduct. Among political philosophers, it was Machiavelli 
who charged the classics with fostering an unmanly spirit of resig-
nation, and who turned toward management which leads by satisfy-
ing. Pangle explores the mixture of old and new political science in 
Machiavellian republicans often called classical, such as James Har-
rington, Henry Neville, and Algernon Sidney. He also concludes 
that the commercial and cautious science advanced by Montesquieu 
and then David Hume may be understood as a revision of a funda-
mentally Machavellian worldliness. Hume, to be sure, suggests a 
natural moral sense or "sympathy." It is guided, however, by utili-
tarian and hedonistic calculations. Hume's moral sense, like 
Montesquieuan moderation, is suspicious of moral zeal and instru-
mental to security, liberty, and self-government. 
According to Pangle, that is the spirit of the Franklins, Madis-
ons, Hamiltons, and Jeffersons. While he offers subtle differentia-
tions, he finds in general that the founders encouraged "a 
productive life, a busy existence and a restless uneasiness." The 
American was to make his own way by his work; he would incline 
away from looking and inquiring: away from "awe for divinity," 
the fine arts, and the intellectual virtues. The founders merely toler-
ated sects; they promoted the useful arts and sciences, de-empha-
sized aristocratic pride and a gentlemanly class, and fostered 
frugality, industry, and commercial honesty. Even the "moral 
sense" doctrines of Jefferson and James Wilson ended by deprecat-
ing the public and the noble. In Jefferson's doctrine, as inHume's, 
the content is determined by calculations of utility and finally by 
happiness. According to Wilson, the moral sense is a passion di-
rected to domestic life; public life is governed by calculation because 
justice is artificial. Is republican self-government, then, merely an 
instrument of private interests or rights, not a worthy choice for its 
own sake? 
With this question Pangle enters upon the major portion of his 
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book, a reconsideration of Locke's moral teaching. No matter how 
often the founding generation referred to Montesquieu, Hume, and 
Cato's Letters, he argues persuasively, it was to the concepts of 
Locke that they turned when they recurred to "ultimate questions." 
Pangle gives us a searching account of Lockean doctrines on Chris-
tianity, property, the relation of morality to epistemology, moral 
education, and the individualistic or nuclear family. 
In Natural Right and History, published almost four decades 
ago, Leo Strauss showed how Locke quietly abused biblical formu-
las while setting forth an anti-biblical doctrine of human needs and 
rights. Pangle, while not denying Strauss's insights, shows why and 
how Locke preserved Christianity as the vehicle of an essentially 
worldly rationalism. A variety of Lockean works prepared what 
later came to be called natural religion, deism, and liberal protes-
tantism. Having reduced the bible to an intellectually unimpressive 
collection of writings by simpletons, Locke inserted the creed of 
natural rights into a Christianity from which he had removed em-
phasis upon guilt, sin, hell, heaven, Christ and, in general, other-
worldly promises and punishments. Liberal Christianity, Pangle 
concludes, was to be less the opiate of the working classes than of 
the educated classes, and Locke allowed them a big dose--one of 
the great doses that produced the enlightened preachers and sects-
while preparing a process of secularization. 
Pangle agrees with Strauss that Locke's is a dynamic and ac-
quisitive reinterpretation of property. He enriches Strauss's ac-
count by comparing Locke's with other philosophic 
understandings, such as Cicero's view that holding property is a 
temporary trust like occupancy of a seat at the theater. He shows 
how the prominence of property in Locke's thought is connected 
with the prominence of the self; Locke treats property as something 
the individual has power to destroy. In Locke's view, acquisition is 
a form of domination; unlimited acquisition is justified by the fun-
damentally unlimited neediness-unblessedness-of the human 
condition. 
No student of Locke's moral teaching can afford to miss Pan-
gle's exploration of the relation between the Two Treatises and the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Again, he is indebted to, 
but does not hesitate to differ from, Strauss's analysis. Pangle ex-
plores the passions in terms of the Essay's language of "simple 
modes" of pleasure, elaborates Locke's enigmatic promise of a de-
ductive theory of morals, shows the Lockean suspicion of imagina-
tion and thus poetry (it makes a "madhouse" of the mind), and 
exhibits Locke's fundamental fear of the desire for power and domi-
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nation and his fear of moral opinion and conscience. Morality, in 
the strict sense, is uncivil as well as unknowable. Has any other 
commentator noticed that the terms "moral," "morality," "moral 
virtue," and "ethics" do not occur even once in the Second Treatise 
of Civil Government? A fundamental desire for life, or an uneasi-
ness at the prospect of death, prompts Locke to make the "preserva-
tion of society" the star of his civil morality. The foundation of 
socialism is close to the foundation of individualism. A Lockean 
concern for others is calculated, however; eros is absent from 
Locke's account of human nature. 
Locke foreshadows Rousseau and the socialists in dwelling on 
the management of custom. Political education by doctrine is to be 
supplemented by moral education through childhood accustoming. 
Locke was the first philosopher to devote an entire treatise to educa-
tion, Pangle points out, and his account of Some Thoughts Concern-
ing Education supplements Nathan Tarcov's Locke's Education for 
Liberty. The natural inclination to dominate must be managed by 
praise and by inculcating a sense of shame, and countered by strong 
measures when obstinacy is involved. The positive virtues include 
"breeding," which is reinterpreted by Locke into civility or compli-
ance with the wishes of others, and a practical aptitude at accounts 
and even trades; Locke was less interested in instilling Christian 
righteousness or aristocratic nonconformity than in shaping a busi-
nesslike and inoffensive individual useful to himself and to others. 
Pangle is original in unfolding the Second Treatise's plan for a 
gradual but radical reformation of the family. Locke thinks the pa-
triarchal family the root of oppression, and proposes instead the 
rational or calculated family. He makes consent the link of father 
and mother (or perhaps of fathers and mothers, since he does not 
exclude polygamy), links parents to their children obscurely (proba-
bly by the additional labor gained), and children to their parents 
clearly (by hope for inheritance). Pangle's whole discussion is illu-
minating, not least to Americans now wrestling with their liberation 
from the nuclear family. 
As to government specifically, Pangle clarifies several implica-
tions of the foundational role of consent: the priority of public 
opinion and majority rule, the right of the majority to rebel, and the 
prominence of intellectuals who know the rational doctrine. Unfor-
tunately, Pangle's general conclusions here are not up to his stan-
dard. Lockean republicanism seems both more authoritative and 
more popular than he suggests. While the legislative power is supe-
rior as of right, the executive has its own and prior necessity rooted 
in the individual's power to execute the law of nature, that is, to 
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punish those who endanger him or others. Then too, the Lockean 
legislative power seems more democratic than Pangle allows; one 
cannot separate it, as he would, from the representative function in 
which everyone, perhaps even the "meanest," can participate by 
election. I would also quarrel with Pangle's plausible suggestion 
that the Lockean executive is one man chosen for life; this does not 
fit with Locke's occasional allusion to the possibility of a plural ex-
ecutive and his emphatic subordination of the executive power as in 
principle ministerial to the legislative. Locke shows signs of antici-
pating parliamentary government, a mixture of a popular legislature 
with a ministerial cabinet of considerable discretion. 
These difficulties with respect to Locke's constitutionalism are 
of secondary importance to Pangle's theme of Locke's moral vision. 
Does Locke succeed in establishing the moral dignity of the rational 
individual? While not accusing Locke of an amoral vision, Pangle 
observes Locke's preoccupation with life and the self, and wonders 
how that can justify sacrifice of life and account for experiences of 
self-transcendence. Can Locke justify his own devotion to the bene-
fit of humanity and to philosophy? While Pangle imputes to Locke 
the devotions of a philosopher, in the old-fashioned sense of one 
devoted to knowing, he also notes the absence from Locke's teach-
ing of any eros for knowing and of questions about the worth of 
philosophy. That puts in question the status of philosophy, and also 
of reason as the moral touchstone of conduct. Yet Locke has "not 
explained, or explained away, or demonstrated, his own escape 
from the experiences of self-transcendence." 
With this difficulty Pangle closes a book that realizes to a re-
markable extent its unusually noble aspiration: "to recover for 
modem liberals and citizens of liberal democracy something of the 
greatness, excitement, and challenge" in the intrepid thinking of 
Locke. By recovering the founder of liberalism as a thinker worth 
arguing with, he shows us a way between Babbitry and the Village 
Voice, between thoughtless complacency and thoughtless revolt. 
